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In practice, every intelligent person is 
superior to his own theory. 
(Rehn: 1980: 52) 
 
Introduction - a Swedish economic policy 
The Rehn-Meidner model is a central feature of the ‘Swedish model’. A report to the 
1951 Congress of the Swedish Confederation of Trade Union (LO) presented a 
coherent economic-policy and wage-policy programme for full employment, price 
stability, growth and equity (LO 1953 [1951]). The programme included a restrictive 
macroeconomic policy, mainly indirect taxes, an active labor market policy and a 
wages policy of solidarity. The 1951 LO report was the result of a team work by LO’s 
research department but its policy programme was later accurately called the Rehn-
Meidner model (henceforth the R-M model).
1 Gösta Rehn – the leading LO 
macroeconomist at that time - was responsible for the sections on stabilisation policy 
while Rudolf Meidner – the head of the LO research department – was the architect 
behind the sections on wage policy and disorganisation problems in an overheated 
economy. The 1951 LO report developed, systematised and summarised Rehn and 
Meidner’s critique of and alternative to Swedish economic policy in the early postwar 
years. In fact, increasingly critical to the social democratic economic policy, the LO 
leadership had already accepted the Rehn-Meidner ideas - with the exception for 
general sales taxes - in 1949-1950. 
 
The R-M model was never consistently and deliberately applied in Sweden. However 
a period from the end of the 1950s up to 1973-1974 must be seen as the golden era of 
the model considering the breakthrough of active labour market policy, wages policy 
of solidarity and indirect taxes and the tendency towards reduced profit shares and 
increased public savings – important intermediate goals of the R-M model.
2 The 
                                                           
1 The term ‘Rehn-Meidner model’ was used in Sweden from the 1960s. e.g. by Rehn, while Meidner 
unpretentiously talked about ‘the Rehn model’. Erik Lundberg also referred, as many other Swedish 
economists, to the ‘Rehn model’ until the 1980s when he made it synonymous with the Rehn-Meidner 
model. According to Rehn the notion ‘the Rehn-Meidner model’ was already used at the 1951 LO 
Congress. See Meidner (1969a:190), Lundberg (1972a: 470 and 483), (1980: 78), (1985: 17-8), Rehn 
(1969: 163, 170).  
 
2 In his memoirs, the Prime Minister Tage Erlander writes that he came to espouse the R-M labour 
market policy at a meeting with the LO leadership in March 1955. It is striking that Erlander declared 
in his memoirs from the mid-1970s that he was committed to the mobility-enhancing labour market   3
model’s political breakthrough, application, performance, underlying theory and 
relevance have been addressed by many social scientists.
3 But no attempts have been 
made earlier to disentangle the theoretical references of the R-M model. The literature 
on Sweden has thus been unable to address the question as to whether the model was 
an innovation or a conventional wisdom in the early post-war period. Meidner and 
Rehn were both engaged in debates with academic economists. Moreover Meidner 
received his PhD in 1954 and Rehn his PhL (filosofie licentiate) in 1957. However, 
their occupation with current economic-policy affairs and minor interest in (or time 
for) abstract theorising and the history of economic ideas made Rehn and Meidner 
less inclined to develop the inspiration sources behind the 1951 LO report.  
. 
This paper’s aim is to distinguish possible influences from contemporary economics 
on the R-M model. A pertinent aim is to assess the model’s originality in general. The 
paper begins with a brief survey over Swedish economic policy before the 
breakthrough of the R-M model (ch. 1). It continues with an account of Rehn and 
Meidner’s growing criticism of economic policy during the first post-war years (ch. 2) 
and of their policy programme (ch. 3). The paper then attempts to find a link between 
the Rehn-Meidner ideas and the Stockholm school (ch. 4); Rehn and Meidner can in 
fact be seen as representatives of the Stockholm school though less prominent in the 
eyes of economic scholars. The following chapters discuss the relation between the 
inflation theory underlying the R-M model and contemporary economics (ch. 5) and 
between the model’s theory of structural change and the partial (static) equilibrium 
labour-market model, an essential  component of economics at the time of the 1951 
LO report (chapter 6). The paper then analyses the importance of works by Swedish 
Schumpeterian economists and Hans W. Singer for the R-M model (ch. 7 and 8). It 
then describes leading Anglo Saxon economists’ view of the uniqueness of the R-M 
model (ch 9). All chapters on the relation between the R-M model and contemporary 
economics (including the Stockholm school) are points of departure for a synthesising 
chapter evaluating the uniqueness of the R-M policy model (ch. 10). The final chapter 
is a summary of the discussion about the model’s origin and novelty (ch. 11). 
                                                                                                                                                                      
policy through its planning aspects. Thus Erlander opposed a market-led reallocation of economic 
resources through labour-market policy means. Erlander (1976: 38-41). 
 
3 See e.g. Ekdahl (2001), Lundberg (1972a), (1985), Bergström (2007), Erixon (2000), (2001), (2008a), 
(2008b).   4
  
1. Swedish economic policy before the Rehn-Meidner model 
The ideas of Keynes and the Stockholm school had a strong impact on Swedish 
economic policy immediately after the Second World War. The post-war programme 
of the labour movement in 1944 (Arbetarrörelsens efterkrigsprogram) was a radical 
child of the Keynesian revolution, showing strong similarities to the ‘Beveridge plan’. 
Both programmes recommended investment planning and regulation of capital and 
product markets (including some nationalisation) to maintain peak levels of 
employment. The Beveridge plan intended to fight inflation tendencies with the help 
of price controls, national wage restraint and other regulations - not through a strict 
economic policy endangering full employment.
4  
 
The post-war programme of the Swedish labour movement was built upon 
expectations of a coming depression similar to the one a few years after the First 
World War. But the expected post-war depression did not occur. The rapid 
reconstruction of Western Europe was favourable to Swedish export industries, which 
specialised in raw materials, semi-finished goods, and investment goods. An export 
boom, coupled with high domestic investments and a pent-up demand for housing and 
durable consumer goods, led to overheating tendencies in the Swedish economy 
during the second half of the 1940s and the early 1950s. Neither social democratic 
governments, nor the non-socialist opposition, were prepared for the problems of 
economic instability typical of an overheated market economy with its inherent 
tendency to low rates of unemployment.  
 
Stabilisation policy in Sweden from the end of the Second World War to the end of 
the 1950s showed similarities to the post-war programme of the labour movement and 
the Beveridge plan. Social democratic governments made ‘full employment’ a 
priority, full employment being more ambitiously defined than during the 1930s. 
Fiscal policy (for general government) was countercyclical but mainly expansionary 
(Matthiesen 1971: 176-7). In fact, in January 1947, with the support of the LO 
leadership, a social democratic government abolished general sales taxes as a part of 
                                                           
4 Arbetarrörelsens efterkrigsprogram (1944), Beveridge (1944: 198-207). Ernst Wigforss was Minister 
of Finance from 1932 until the summer of 1949 and also the chairman of the committee responsible for 
the post-war programme of the Swedish labour movement.   5
its stabilisation policy. Furthermore, a policy of permanently low interest rates - 
which was made possible through currency regulation – led to a vast increase in 
liquidity in the Swedish economy. 
 
The government revalued the krona in 1946 in order to weaken inflationary impulses 
from abroad. But after the revaluation, in line with the Beveridge plan, the 
government undertook a series of extraordinary measures to alleviate overheating and 
improve the trade balance. It fought domestic inflationary tendencies in 1946-1948 
through profit and selective purchase taxes, price controls and regulation of the 
construction sector. Many measures were facilitated by regulation instruments 
developed during the war. In 1947, the emergence of a large current-account deficit 
resulted in import regulations. In the fall of 1948, the government also managed to 
persuade LO to accept a ‘wage stop’ for 1949 (in effect a prolongation of the 1948 
collective agreements). An extension of the wage stop until 1950 led to increased 
tensions between the government and LO. These tensions culminated in September 
1949 when the government devalued the krona. The Swedish devaluation was caused 
most immediately by the devaluation of the British pound. The krona was devalued 
by 30 per cent in relation to the dollar, and by 13-15 per cent in relation to the 
currencies of Sweden’s main competitors on the export market. Soon after the 
devaluation (in 1950), Sweden joined the Bretton Woods agreement from 1944, which 
stipulated fixed exchange rates, provided the countries were not hit by major external 
imbalances. 
 
The devaluation of 1949, in combination with a positive demand and price 
development for Swedish export products during the Korean War, led to a surplus in 
the current account and a profit boom for Swedish export industries 1950-1951.
5 
Sweden also experienced a wage explosion and a relatively high rate of inflation. The 
government did not revaluate but attempted to check inflation by regulation of the 
construction industry, price controls, stricter rules of inventory valuation, profit 
freezes and by levying duties on investments and exports. In 1952-1953, the pace of 
inflation was muted by a ‘mini recession’ and a normalisation of export prices. But 
                                                           
5 Export prices increased particularly for the raw materials industries representing more than half of 
Swedish export value during the 1940s and 1950s. 
   6
the subsequent recovery entailed overheating again in 1955-1956. For the first time 
during the post-war period, the Central Bank (Riksbanken) forcefully tightened 
monetary policy, at the same time as the government tried to alleviate overheating by 
imposing investment fees and by phasing out the use of free depreciation allowances 
for machinery and equipment.
6 
 
To summarise, from the end of the Second World War to the end of the 1950s 
Sweden, as many other Western countries, followed an economic-policy programme 
which might be labeled the post-war Keynesian model. Swedish fiscal policy was 
countercyclical, as was monetary policy from the mid 1950s, but with a tendency to 
expansionism. Governments tried to cushion the inflationary effects of their economic 
policies, and the tendencies to deficits in the current account, through regulation, 
including informal incomes policy, and by extraordinary fiscal measures to weaken 
the incentives to invest, and to moderate price and wage increases in the most 
overheated industries. Indirect taxes, fundamental ingredients of the R-M model, were 
not used as a source of government incomes, with the exception of selective purchase 
taxes. What is more, the role of employment offices was reduced in Sweden in the 
early 1950s (Wadensjö 2001: 7-8). Moreover, during the period of the Keynesian 
post-war model, wage gaps between industries actually increased in Swedish 




2. The Rehn-Meidner critique 
Meidner and Rehn expressed a growing discontent with Swedish economic policy in 
the early postwar years. They opposed, in contrast to the LO leadership, the decision 
in 1947 to abolish general sales taxes and further, the prolongation of the ‘wage stop’ 
in 1949 (Ekdahl 2001: 276-84). Later Rehn claimed that he and Meidner had already 
outlined an alternative economic policy at a briefing for Prime Minister Tage Erlander 
in November 1946 (Rehn 1977a: 205). In any case, as members of a ‘querulous 
group’ around Erlander – which met rather regularly from Spring 1947 – Rehn and 
                                                           
6 The abandonment of the policy of permanently low interest rates had been delayed by the coalition 
government in 1951-1957 constituted by representatives of the Social Democratic Party and the 
Agrarian Party, Bondeförbundet (Centerpartiet from 1958). 
 
7 See Lundh (2002: 203), Erixon (1991: 281-3).   7
Meidner had a forum to present their objections to the government’s economic policy 
and pinpoint their ideas of a sustainable economic policy under full employment 
conditions.
8 Furthermore, from the end of 1947, by participating in a discussion group 
linked to Tiden, the theoretical and ideological journal of the Swedish Social 
Democrat Party, Rehn and Meidner could elucidate their critical opinions and 
constructive ideas about Swedish economic and wage policy. In 1948 they started to 
write articles for Tiden and for social democratic newspapers and trade-union 
periodicals envisaging an alternative policy strategy.
9 Moreover, in Ekonomisk 
Tidskrift 1950, Rehn replied to Erik Lundberg’s critique of his article in Tiden two 
years earlier.
10 In February 1951 Rehn presented a memoranda the Joint Committee 
of the Nordic Social Democratic Labour Movement (SAMAK) on stabilisation policy 
(Rehn 1951). 
 
In their works before the 1951 LO report Rehn and Meidner asserted that the 
measures by the social democrat government to combat inflation were ineffective. 
Collective wage restraint cannot prevent extensive wage drift, i.e. wage increases 
outside central agreements, in an overheated economy. ‘Voluntary’ incomes policy is 
a threat to trade-union ambitions to even out wage differentials. Wage-wage-price 
spirals will also appear in due course through claims for compensation for wage drift 
in central negotiations, claims that are easier to satisfy under full employment 
conditions.
11 Moreover the two LO economists conjectured that the measures to fight 
inflation in the post-war Keynesian model might even be harmful for economic 




Meidner focused on an avoidable political dilemma for the trade union movement in 
an economy with full employment. Labour scarcity will increase the opportunities for 
                                                           
8 Ekdahl (2001: 175-76 and 262-71), Erlander (1974: 234-40). Erlander was sceptical to the querulous 
group’s proposal of a new economic policy. According to his diaries Erlander was even more critical to 
the Rehn and Meidner’s ideas in 1947-1951 than displayed by his memoirs (S. Erlander 2001a, 2001b). 
 
9  See e.g. Meidner (1952 [1948], Rehn (1949), (1952a [1948]). 
 
10 See Lundberg (1952b [1950], Rehn (1952b [1950]). 
 
11 See Rehn (1952 [1948]: 38-43), Meidner (1952 [1948]: 18-20). 
 
12 Rehn (1952a [1948]: 48-9), Meidner (1952 [1948]: 21).   8
and the pressure on trade unions to alter income distribution in favour of labour. On 
the other hand, full employment will elevate pressure on the trade union movement to 
take responsibility for stabilisation. One aspect of this dilemma is that ‘voluntary’ 
incomes policy will, particularly in a situation of extensive wage drift, lead to stronger 
tensions between the central organisation (LO) and member unions, between trade 
unions, and between rank-and file members and trade-union representatives. Wage 
moderation in an overheated economy is therefore a threat to the cohesion and 
legitimacy of the labour movement. Furthermore the failure of voluntary incomes 
policy is a threat to central wage negotiations independent of the government, a 
principle enunciated in Sweden by the Saltsjöbaden Agreement between LO and SAF 
(the Employers’ Federation) in 1938.
13  
 
3. The content of the Rehn-Meidner model 
In some respects the description of the R-M policy model is a complicated task. The 
model is based on all four goals of economic policy - full employment, price stability, 
high economic growth and equity. Each instrument in the model was also intended to 
satisfy more than one goal and to interact with the other means of the model. 
Furthermore Rehn and Meidner never made any attempt to formulate a formal 
(mathematical) model defining the parameters of their policy programme or the 
underpinning price, wage and productivity equations; the only exception here is the 
wage function in a joint article by Rehn and Bent Hansen (Hansen and Rehn 1956). 
However, in another respect, the account of the R-M policy model is an easy task - the 
core of the model is the same in the 1951 LO report as in Rehn and Meidner’s other 
publications. Their policy programme and view of underlying economic mechanisms 
in the 1980s and 1990s coincided largely with those of the 1951 LO report.
14  
 
The unvarying character of Rehn and Meidner’s approach to economic policy shall 
not hide, however, that there were some shifts in their priority of goals and 
instruments and their use of analytical concepts over time. Both before and 
immediately after the 1951 LO report Rehn sanctioned the early post-war policy of 
low interest rates by criticising the use of monetary measures in Swedish stabilisation 
                                                           
13 Meidner (1952 [1948], 17, 21, 24-8), see also Rehn (1949: 462-63), (1952a [1948]: 36, 48-9). 
 
14 See Rehn (1982), (1986), (1987), Meidner (1999: 92-3).   9
policy. He primarily referred to need for stable investment conditions in the 
construction sector.
15 But both in Rehn’s SAMAK memoranda and in the 1951 LO 
report a restrictive monetary policy was placed almost on equal footing with a 
contractionary fiscal policy.
16 In 1955 Meidner recommended the social democrat 
government to fight inflation by the use of restrictive monetary policy means 
(Erlander 1976: 39). In later works Rehn and Meidner were largely indifferent 
between the two macroeconomic policy measures.
17 The presentation of the R-M 
model’s macroeconomic policy below will not discriminate between the use of fiscal 
and monetary measures. 
 
Rehn and Meidner had first prioritised restrictive fiscal policy measures to increase 
public saving at the expense of company saving; they preferred public saving for 
distribution-policy and economic-planning purposes. The planning, industry-policy, 
arguments for public saving were more obvious in Rehn and Meidner’s work in the 
late 1940s than in the 1951 LO report and even more so than in their later works.
18 
Labour market policy is the only ‘selective’ instrument of the R-M model in this 
paper.  
 
In the late 1940s and early 1950s Rehn and Meidner concentrated more on 
macroeconomic stabilisation than on economic growth. Even the 1951 LO report paid 
a peripheral interest only to the effect of labour market policies on structural change, 
productivity and also on wage equalisation. However, the growth perspective was 
central in the report by the LO economists to the 1961 LO congress; Meidner was 
then still the head of LO research department. Moreover, as a director at the OECD 
                                                           
15 Rehn (1952a [1948]: 51-2), (1952b [1950]: 73-8), (1953: 288-9). 
 
16 See Rehn (1951), LO (1953 [1951]: 84, 90-1). 
 
17 Rehn and Meidner’s neutral attitude to restrictive fiscal and monetary policy means in later works is 
shown by Meidner (1969a: 190-1), Rehn (1969: 164-6, 160-70), (1977a: 221-2), (1986: 74). 
 
18 Cf. Rehn (1952a [1948]: 36, 51), (1952b [1950]: 74), (Rehn (1953: 284), Meidner (1969a: 189-95). 
However, the return of industry-policy ambitions by LO and the social democratic government in the 
late 1960s was also manifested in Meidner’s work (ibid.:195-8).     
    10
secretariat from 1962, Rehn focused more than earlier on labour market policy, labour 
mobility and market-led structural change.
19  
 
In their discussion of stabilisation policy in the 1960s Rehn and Meidner began to 
relate their policy programme to the notion of the Phillips curve, seeing labour market 
policy measures, and also profit-squeezing policies, as instruments to shift this curve 
downward.
20  In the 1970s, Rehn and Meidner made some amendments to their policy 
programme. Rehn came enthusiastically to advocate marginal employment subsidies 
to improve the trade-off between inflation and unemployment while Meidner made a 
proposal of collective wage-earner funds to appropriate ‘excess profits’ from the 
wages policy of solidarity. However, marginal employment subsidies and wage earner 
funds will not be considered as parts of the Rehn-Meidner policy programme (see 
Figure 1). 
Figure 1: The Rehn-Meidner economic and wage policy model – means and objectives 
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19 The 1951 report was ambiguous on the issue whether the mobility-enhancing labour market policy 
should be market conforming or meet certain industrial-policy ambitions. The report claimed that the 
transfer of labour should benefit regions, firms and industries ‘…where the prospects of expansion are 
favourable.’ But the report also maintained that labour should be transferred ‘…to places where it is 
most needed.’ (LO (1953 [1951]: 93), see also Rehn (1952a [1948]: 47). 
 
20 See Meidner (1969b), Rehn (1969: 170).    11
The R-M model recommends countercyclical macroeconomic policy and even 
significant intentional public deficits in a deep recession.
21 But in contrast to the post-
war Keynesian model the R-M model advocates a restrictive fiscal and monetary 
policy in the medium term (over the business cycle). Later Rehn suggested 
revaluation as a deflationary measure – the R-M model was defined for an economy 
of fixed exchange rates.
22 An important objective of restrictive macroeconomic policy 
in combination with a ‘selective’ policy for full employment is to restrict wage drift 
by the associated squeeze on company profit margins. Rehn and Meidner emphasised 
in the 1951 LO report, and also in other works, that high profit margins are 
inflationary by increasing firms’ possibilities and willingness to engage in wage 
bidding to recruit and keep scarce labour. Wage drift at the initiative of employers 
will induce compensatory demands from wage earners experiencing moderate wage 
drift to recapture earlier relative-wage positions.
23 The term ‘wage drift’ was probably 
invented by Rehn (Nycander 2005: 148, 151). 
 
In the R-M model active labour market policy (ALMP) is an instrument to secure both 
full employment and a profit decline under restrictive macroeconomic policy 
conditions; Rehn and Meidner assumed that full employment would keep up nominal 
wages and reduce profit margins by increasing the negotiating strength of labour. A 
profit-margin decline would not only combat inflation, Rehn and Meidner argued, but 
also increase labours’ share of GDP in the medium term and contribute to economic 
growth by putting rationalisation pressure on firms.
24 
 
When defining ALMP Rehn and Meidner referred both to regional and firm specific 
actions stimulating labour demand without large multiplier effects (except in a deep 
recession) and to measures increasing mobility between occupations, companies and 
regions, for example employment exchange services, vocational training and subsidies 
                                                           
21 Rehn (1952a [1948]: 52), (1952b [1950]: 64 and 76), (1969: 166, 180), (1982: 1-3, 8, 18, 26), LO 
(1953 [1951]: 91).  
 
22 See LO (1953 [1951]: 84 and 90-1), see also Rehn (1969: 164-6 and 169-70), (1977a: 223). 
 
23 Meidner (1948 [1952]: 19-29), Rehn (1952a [1948]: 32-43, 49), (1952b [1950], 74-7), (1987:  67-8), 
LO (1953 [1951]: 87, 91-3). 
 
24 Rehn (1949: 466), 1952 [1948]: 47, 49), (1977a: 212), LO (1953 [1951]: 94-9).   12
to regional mobility.
25 The matching and supply oriented measures were only meant 
to be selective in the sense that they should benefit dynamic companies, industries and 
regions. Mobility-enhancing ALMP measures are necessary conditions for price 
stability and structural change in the R-M model. They are also preconditions for the 
wages policy of solidarity and the avoidance of structural unemployment in the wake 
of this wage policy. 
 
A policy of solidarity wages – which needs coordinated wage bargaining – states that 
wage earners with similar work must receive the same reward regardless of the 
profitability of companies and industries. Wage differentials shall reflect differences 
in working conditions and work content, for example differences in skill providing 
incentives for education.
26 Equal pay for similar work would put pressure on 
companies and industries with relatively low profit margins (low productivity) to 
rationalise or die freeing resources for the expansion of dynamic companies and 
industries.
27 The recommendation of structural change through fair wages (and 
ALMP) in the 1951 LO report was based on the hypothesis that a reallocation of 
labour on a ‘free’ labour market would generally require large wage differentials in 
the short run which are both unfair and inflationary (see ch. 6 below).  
 
According to Rehn and Meidner wages of solidarity lead not only to equity and 
structural change but also to price stability. Solidarity wage policy would restrict 
wage drift in profitable companies and industries which could have paid higher 
wages.
28 What is more, Rehn and Meidner stressed in the 1951 LO report and in 
earlier works that a fair wage structure would alleviate inflationary wage-wage races. 
However, they made the reservation that a wages policy of solidarity cannot attain 
price stability (or structural change) without restrictive macroeconomic policies.
29 
                                                           
25 Rehn (1948 [1952]: 34), LO (1953 [1951]: 92-3). 
 
26 See Rehn (1952a [1948]: 43-4), LO (1953 [1951]: 97-9). 
   
27 See Rehn (1948 [1952]: 43-4n), Meidner 1948 [1952]: 25, LO (1953 [1951]: 25-6, 34-5). The notion 
of ‘rationalisation’ was broad in the 1951 report including reductions of production slacks, 
organisational changes, labour substitution and even the adoption of new technologies (LO 1953 
[1951]: 24). We will reserve the concept for the case of reductions of production slacks above.   
 
28 Rehn (1953: 280-4), (1977a: 214). 
   13
 
The 1951 LO report repeated Rehn and Meidner’s argument that incomes policy 
(wage restraint and price controls) and other regulations are ineffective measures to 
fight inflation when full employment is achieved through Keynesianism, and that 
these measures might even be harmful, both for society and the trade union movement 
(LO 1953 [1951]: 81-7). The report also underlined an earlier argument by Rehn and 
Meidner that productivity growth is lower in an overheated inflationary economy e.g. 
due to disorganisation problems in companies and excessive labour turnover rates.
30 
A novelty in the LO report was that Rehn and Meidner argued for constant profits 
shares in the long run through central wage moderation, thus after a reduction of this 
share in the medium term through economic-policy means. To prevent inflation and 
profits from falling below a critical value in the long run the trade union movement 
can and must take responsibility for a wage development in accordance with 
productivity increases (LO 1953 [1951]: 93-4, 99). 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
4. The Rehn-Meidner model and the Stockholm school 
An embryo to the R-M model can be found in Gustav Cassel’s Socialpolitik from 
1902 (see Cassel 1902: 61-105). Cassel recommended that trade unions should pursue 
a wages policy of solidarity in order to enhance overall productivity. Stronger 
pressure on inefficient firms would result in rationalisations, innovations (e.g. through 
the development of labour-saving technologies) and structural change (e.g. through 
firm concentration). Cassel also suggested that possible increases in unemployment 
should be met by public vocational training (apprenticeship programmes). However 
Cassel did not discuss the possibility of squeezing profit margins through the 
combination of tight fiscal and monetary policies and ALMP measures. Moreover, in 
Socialpolitik, the distinction between high average wages and wage equalisation as a 
source of productivity increases was not completely clear.  
 
In the 1920s, Cassel largely abandoned his trade-union model of economic progress 
(Nycander 2005: 41-6). And Rehn and Meidner were probably ignorant of Cassel’s 
 
29 See Rehn (1949: 464), (1952a [1948]: 31-2, 39-44), (1952b [1950]: 74-5), (1977a: 216), LO (1953 
[1951]: 89-91, 95-6, 99).  
30 Cf. Rehn (1948: 183), LO (1953 [1951]: 37-47, 81-2, 86-7). 
   14
arguments for solidarity wages at the time of the 1951 LO report. Instead they were 
formed as economists by Keynes and the Stockholm-school economists, thus by 
economic scholars contributing to the marginalisation of Cassel.
31  
 
State interventionism to even out business-cycle fluctuations and social engineering 
were guiding principles of the Stockholm school of economics and also of the R-M 
model. Meidner and Rehn’s ideas were certainly rooted in the Stockholm-school 
tradition. In the 1930s they had had Gunnar Myrdal and Lundberg as teachers in 
economics and also participated in higher seminars led by Myrdal and Lundberg at 
Stockholm University (Stockholms högskola). During the second half of the 1930s 
Meidner participated in research projects led by Myrdal. Furthermore both Meidner 
and Rehn were employed by Konjunkturinstitutet, the National Institute for Economic 
Research (1938-1940 and 1947-1948 respectively) under the direction of Lundberg. 
Lundberg was also Meidner’s advisor in his thesis work at Konjunkturinstitutet in 
1950-1951. Rehn had served as a coordinater, and Myrdal as an expert, in the Post-
war Committee of the Labour Movement (Arbetarrörelsens efterkrigsråd) responsible 
for the post-war programme. Rehn was therefore one of the authors of the programme 
under Myrdal’s supervision. Later Rehn maintained that the post-war programme of 
the labour movement contained many ideas that then appeared in the 1951 LO report. 
Moreover in 1949-1950 Rehn and Lundberg debated Swedish economic and wage 
policy, not only in Ekonomisk Tidskrift but also, for example, at Stockholm University 
(Nycander 2005: 119-50). 
 
Both Meidner and Rehn considered themselves as Myrdal’s disciples. Rehn often 
expressed a spiritual affinity to Myrdal. The fathers of the ‘Swedish model’ inherited 
Myrdal’s scepticism towards axiomatic-deductive theorising in economics. However, 
it is difficult to discern distinct contributions from Myrdal to the R-M model. Rehn’s 
later argument that the post-war programme of the Swedish labour movement 
                                                           
31 It is also unlikely that Rehn and Meidner were influenced by the Swedish economist Gösta Bagge’s 
analysis of wages policy of solidarity, or by Bagge’s partial-equilibrium analysis of wages, 
unemployment and structural change, in his dissertation from 1917. Bagge was appointed professor in 
economics in 1921 at Stockholm University where Meidner and Rehn were students in the 1930s. 
However, in the 1930s, Bagge was neither engaged in teaching/research at Stockholm University, nor 
an influential economist in Sweden. In fact, between 1935 and 1944, Bagge was leader for the Swedish 
Conservative Party (Högerpartiet). Wadensjö (2005: 58). 
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anticipated the R-M model is far-fetched.
32 Moreover Myrdal’s occupation with 
reinforcing cumulative real processes, first in businesss-cycle analysis and then in 
development studies, has no correspondence in Rehn or Meidner’s work. A common 
opinion is that they were inspired by Myrdal’s Höga skatter och låga räntor 
published in 1944. Here Myrdal argued, as later Rehn and Meidner, for a reduction of 
profits through higher taxes and the use of fiscal measures (and investment controls) 
rather than monetary measures in stabilisation policy. Myrdal’s equity and industrial-
policy arguments for high taxes and low interest rates accorded with Rehn and 
Meidner’s view in the late 1940s. Rehn and Meidner also shared Myrdal’s opinion 
that a policy of low interest rates should particularly favour construction, a prioritised 
sector in Sweden at that time (Myrdal 1944: 164-6). A similar conformity between 
Myrdal and Rehn-Meidner appeared through the former’s suggestion of an 
overbalanced public budget if private saving (due to low interest rates) becomes too 
small (ibid., p. 168). 
 
But there are crucial differences between the ‘Myrdal model’ and the R-M model. In 
the early post-war period Rehn in particular challenged a regulation, industrial-policy, 
view of economic policy in favour of a more market-conforming approach. 
Furthermore, Rehn and Meidner emphasised the stabilisation-policy rather than the 
distribution and industrial-policy arguments for squeezing profit margins through 
higher taxes. Gradually Rehn and Meidner softened their critique of monetary 
measures in stabilisation policy to finally conceive fiscal and monetary policies as 
equally effective measures to combat inflation by bringing down profits in the 
business sector.
33 The difference between the Myrdal and Rehn-Meidner views is 
shown by their definition of which profits should be squeezed by fiscal measures. 
Myrdal recommended lower corporate profits after tax while Rehn and Meidner 
wished to reduce profits before taxes (and dividends). In fact, they feared that high 
                                                           
32 The post-was programme recommended mobility-enhancing labour market policy and solidaristic 
wage policy (Arbetarrörelsens efterkrigsprogram (1944: 12-3, 15, 74-8). But there were no arguments 
for these policy measures in terms of structural change and low inflation as in the R-M model. In the 
discussion of price stability the post-war programme focused on the risk of deflation in Sweden and 
other countries. Moreover, inflation was seen as an exceptional speculation phenomenon, not as a 
consequence of expansionary macroeconomic policy and full employment (ibid.: 47-61).  
 
33 Cf. Rehn (1952a: 51-2), Rehn (1952 [1950]: 75-6), (1951), LO (1953 [1951]: 84, 90-91), Rehn, 
(1969: 164-6, 169-70).   16
profit taxes might be inflationary. The companies would make unnecessary 
expenditures through the opportunity for tax allowances.
34 
 
As the main discussant of the Rehn-Meidner’s ideas Lundberg forced the two LO 
economists to pinpoint the performance of their policy means and the underlying 
economic mechanisms. Rehn and Meidner shared Lundberg’s fear of inflation and, 
therefore, his critique of abolishing general sales taxes in 1947. They were also 
influenced by Lundberg’s and Bertil Ohlin’s analysis in the late 1940s of the adverse 
productivity effects of an overheated economy. In fact, in his dissertation from the 
mid-1950s, Meidner was concerned with the negative productivity effects of excess 
demand conditions in labour and product markets.
35  
 
However, the influence from Lundberg on the R-M model was minor; Lundberg 
reacted on rather than contributed to the model. Rehn and Meidner never referred to, 
but rather denied in informal contacts, any influence from Lundberg. Moreover, in his 
analysis of the R-M model Lundberg seldom missed the opportunity to declare the 
originality of the ‘Rehn model’.
36 He emphasised the logic of the model’s economic-
policy programme and the unique features of its underlying economic theory. 
Lundberg often referred to the ‘Rehn-Salter model’ to illuminate that the R-M model 
was a forerunner of the vintage approach in growth economics (cf. Salter 1960). He 
shed light on the inevitable consequence of the model that the downward pressure on 
prices as a result of a restrictive economic policy would stimulate productivity 
through squeezing intra-marginal profit margins. If wages for identical work are 
uniform (the wage policy of solidarity) low-productivity firms would then need to 
rationalise or perish, in which case resources for structural change would be 
                                                           
34 Myrdal (ibid., p. 166), LO (1953 [1951]: 148-9), Rehn (1977a: 13-4), Rehn (1987: 68). 
 
35 Lundberg and Ohlin’s emphasised disorganisation problems (e.g. through high absenteeism) and 
excessive labour turnover rates in an overheated economy. Rehn and Meidner added the risk of more 
work accidents and less occupational training. See Ohlin (1949: 10-26), Lundberg (1952a: 9), (1952b 
[1950]: 70-1), LO (1953 [1951]: 37). 
 
36 See e.g. Lundberg (1952b [1950]: 69), (1972b: 12-3), (1980: 78). Despite his conviction that Rehn’s 
ideas were path-breaking, Lundberg did not, as an evaluator, consider Rehn as qualified for a position 
as professor in economics in the early 1970s. Furthermore, in great agony, Lundberg ranked Rehn as 
number three only among the applicants for a position as professor in labour market policy (Lundberg 
1972b: 18-9). However Rehn was ultimately awarded the professorship by the social democratic 
government.    17
liberated.
37 The Rehn-Salter model must assume that nominal wages are more rigid 
than prices; in the R-M model labour market policy sustaining full employment 
prevents nominal wages from being fully adjusted to shifts downward in aggregate 
demand. Intra-marginal profits will then decline if product markets are highly 
competitive.  
 
In his presentation of the R-M model Lundberg also referred to Harvey Leibenstein’s 
productivity theory of X-inefficiencies from the mid-1960s. Harder external pressure, 
mainly through stronger competition, leads under bounded rationality to 
rationalisation of firms and industries (Leibenstein 1966). In the Rehn-Meidner 
growth theory, rationalisation is stimulated by lower intra-marginal profits through 
deflationary macroeconomic policy under full-employment conditions or, as Rehn 
emphasised in the 1960s, in an international recession. Rehn also suggested in the late 
1960s, perhaps under the influence of Leibenstein, that rationalisation occurs in a 




Lundberg’s reference to the innovative Rehn-Salter model is one indication that the 
R-M model was not the offspring of the Stockholm school. Lundberg critical attitude 
to Rehn and Meidner’s policy programme is another. He mainly refuted the R-M 
model on political and ideological grounds – major public savings and selective 
economic policy programmes would cause the emergence of a bureaucratic control 
apparatus that in the long term posed a threat to democracy. Lundberg therefore 
favoured monetary instead of fiscal measures in the struggle against inflation. In 
economic terms Lundberg’s main objection to the model was that it underestimated 
the importance of full employment, in contrast to high profits, for inflation and of 
high profits, both ex ante and ex post, for private investment. To stabilise the 
economy Lundberg argued (as Ohlin) for a reduction in the high policy ambitions of 
2-3 per cent open unemployment. Moreover, admitting the risk of financial ‘locking-
                                                           
37 Lundberg (1972a: 470-4), (1972b: 12), (1985: 17-8). In the Salter-Solow vintage model all firms pay 
the same wage for uniform labour in competitive labour markets. 
 
38 Cf. Leibensten (ibid.: 408-9 and 412-3), Rehn (1969: 151-2, 157), (1977a: 214-5).   18
in’ effects from self-financing, Lundberg advocated deregulation and capital tax 
reductions to improve the functioning of the capital market, not public saving.
39  
 
A not too bold conclusion is that the R-M model was not the direct result of economic 
theorising and policy analysis by economists regarded as core members of the 
Stockholm school. Myrdal’s industrial-policy perspective was present in Rehn and 
Meidner’s early post-war publications but they had largely abandoned this perspective 
at the time of the 1951 LO report. Lundberg was, despite his critical view, more 
influenced by Rehn and Meidner than the other way round. The policy and theory of 
the R-M model (see the Rehn-Salter model) were the benchmark models (together 
with the Scandinavian inflation model) and also the Swedish contributions to post-war 
economics in Lundberg’s two articles for leading economic journals in the 1970s and 
1980. Sometimes Rehn and Meidner made the ironic remark that Lundberg, their 
main opponent in the domestic economic-policy debate, turned into an ambassador of 
the ‘Swedish model’ abroad (see Rehn 1980: 69). According to a more benevolent 
view, by his articles and speeches, Lundberg actually paved the way for the R-M 
model on the international scene. It is obvious, however, that we have to search 
outside the Stockholm school to find sources of inspiration for the R-M model. 
 
5. The Rehn-Meidner theory of inflation in contemporary 
economics 
A positive relationship between actual profit margins and nominal wage increases is 
basic in Rehn and Meidner’s inflation theory. They emphasised in various work that 
high profits would induce intense wage competition for scarce labour between firms 
(see ch. 3). This relationship largely explains why actual profit margins are additional 
determinants of nominal wages in relation to labour-market conditions in the Rehn-
Meidner theory.  
 
The market-oriented character of the Rehn-Meidner inflation theory and Bent 
Hansen’s theoretical orientation made it natural to use a marginal-productivity 
framework in (Hansen and Rehn 1956), focusing on marginal profits from hiring 
labour and on wage drift. Hansen and Rehn’s wage-drift theory emphasised the 
                                                           
39 Lundberg (1952b [1950]: 67), (1953: 413-22), (1972: 480-5), (1985: 19).   19
impact of market forces. However they gave profits an independent position in 
relation to labour demand (with exogenous labour supply). Hansen and Rehn divided 
total marginal profits from hiring labour into an excess-profit and an excess-demand 
effect (Hansen and Rehn 1956: 93-9). 
 
Nils Henrik Schager has claimed that the Hansen-Rehn article anticipated the Phillips-
curve discussion of a relationship between labour market conditions and inflation; 
Phillip’s article was published two years later. A similar relation was already 
discussed in the 1951 LO report – increasing labour strength through low 
unemployment would result in higher nominal wage growth. Schager maintained that 
the importance of market forces (labour scarcity) for wage increases was more 
obvious in (Hansen and Rehn 1956) than in other works by Rehn, or in the Phillips-




Yet Hansen and Rehn’s separation between excess-profit and excess-demand effects 
on wage drift within a marginal-productivity framework was theoretically dubious 
and also impossible to test (see Erixon 2000: 24-5). Furthermore Hansen’s 
formalisation did not do full justice to the Rehn-Meidner inflation theory in which 
actual profits have a significant role. As a consequence, the Hansen-Rehn approach 
could not capture the simultaneous-equation idea in the R-M model that the tendency 
to wage increases through a policy for full employment (leading to labour scarcity) 
would be mitigated by the connected fall in actual profits. 
 
It is true that Hansen and Rehn formulated hypotheses saying that actual profit 
margins are important driving forces behind wage drift in and of itself (Hansen and 
Rehn, 1956: 89). But these hypotheses were ad hoc amendments to their marginal 
productivity theory and, more important, they concealed that labour demand is the 
crucial channel between actual profits and nominal wages in other works by Rehn and 
also in the 1951 LO report. A market-oriented explanation of the profit-wage 
relationship is excluded in the Hansen-Rehn model by the assumptions that capital 
markets are perfect and labour fully variable. A reasonable interpretation of the Rehn-
                                                           
40 Schager (1988: 24-7), (1989: 651).   20
Meidner view of the relationship between actual profits and wage drift must focus on 
the importance of retained earnings and fixed (indispensable) labour. Higher profits 
will increase the self-financing capacity of investing firms, and also of non-investing 
firms to keep indispensable employees, intensifying wage bidding for a given labour 
supply. Another plausible interpretation of the Rehn-Meidner wage theory still has 
firms and their managers as the main actors. But it considers a relationship between 
actual profits and wages that is not associated with a change in labour demand – high 
profits will increase firms’ willingness (and also financial capacity) to pay higher 
wages than motivated by labour’s (marginal) productivity.
41 
 
Rehn and Meidner’s inflation theory had few correspondences in contemporary 
economics. The emphasis in Hansen (1951) on induced wage increases through 
(disequilibrium) excess-demand conditions in labour markets facilitated the 
collaboration between Hansen and Rehn. Both were critical to the bargaining or 
exogenous view of nominal wages in the Keynesian tradition (Hansen and Rehn 1956: 
87-8). But the basic ideas behind the R-M model had already been shaped in the late 
1940s and there are no indications that Rehn (or Meidner) ever read Hansen’s purely 
theoretical work on inflation. Moreover there are significant differences between 
Hansen (1951) and the 1951 LO report. Hansen provided no scope, as Rehn and 
Meidner, for the possibility that extensive wage drift would induce wage-wage-price 
spirals, especially under full employment conditions. He also toned downed the 
possibility that wage-price races in general might generate a strong fall in the price-
wage ratio leading to unemployment (see Hansen, ibid.: 167-8). In fact, Hansen did 
not doubt, as Rehn and Meidner, that full employment could be sustained by 
expansionary macroeconomic policy means (see Hansen, ibid.: 239-46).
42 In this 
                                                           
41 See Rehn (1952a: 32-43), (1957b: 231), (1969: 163, 170), (1982: 31), (1987: 65-8), LO (1953 
[1951]: 92-3), Hansen and Rehn (1956: 89), Erixon (2000: 25-9), (2001: 23-4). In some works by 
Rehn, including the Rehn-Hansen article, this hypothesis about manager/owner psychology (X-
inefficient wages) is combined with a hypothesis about wage earner psychology similar to one in the 
modern efficiency-wage theory – high profits will provoke employees, concerned about equity, to 
demand high nominal wage increases; Rehn (and Hansen) also suggested, as modern efficiency-wage 
theorists, that profit-maximising firms would accept these wage claims to prevent destructive labour 
performance. Cf. Hansen and Rehn (1956: 89-90), Rehn (1957a: 106), (1982: 2), (1986: 76-7), (1987: 
65, 68, 76), Akerlof and Yellen (1990: 268-9). 
 
42 Rehn and Meidner emphasised the threats to full employment from wage-wage spirals but also that 
high inflation with expansionary macroeconomic policies would lead to lower productivity or call forth 
(together with current-account problems) either restrictive macroeconomic policy measures, 
threatening full employment, or regulations hampering productivity (LO 1953 [1951]: 89-91).   21
respect the LO report is actually more modern than Hansen (1951). Furthermore, 
Hansen (1951) did not embrace the distinction in Hansen and Rehn (1956) between 
labour scarcity and profits as determinants of nominal wages. 
 
Neither were actual profits strategic variables in econometric models at the time of the 
1951 LO report. Profits were central determinants in Jan Tinbergen’s econometric 
models of the 1930s. But macroeconomists in the early post-war period followed 
Keynes in the General Theory by putting less weight on ‘wind-fall profits’. In 
Lawrence Klein’s econometric modelling of the US economy actual profits (current or 
lagged) explained consumption and investment but not wages (Klein 1950: 60-2). In 
the Klein-Goldberg model of the US economy developed from the early 1950s, 
corporate profits were only of interest for retained earnings. Moreover, in this model, 
retained earnings were only a determinant of personal disposable income (Evans 
1969: 497-8). The nominal-wage function of the Brookings model from the 1960s 
contained a profitability argument. However the following Wharton model dropped 
this profit argument (by empirical reasons). It was not until the 1980s that profits were 
focused again in mainstream economics. Edmund Malinvaud mentioned political 
worries about negative profitability trends as his main inspiration (Malinvaud 1980: 
4).  
 
Lundberg claimed in the early 1970s that firms’ profits had had a more central role in 
the policy debate in Sweden than in many other countries after the Second World War 
(Lundberg 1972: 465). The independent influence of R-M model is probably an 
important explanation of the Swedish concern for profits. Rehn and Meidner largely 
based their inflation theory, in which actual profits have a central role, on experiences 
of the Swedish bargaining process. Moreover, by surveying the LO-SAF negotiations 
and providing recommendations and statistics to LO negotiators Rehn and Meidner 
gained the insight that extensive wage drift in dynamic sectors would unleash 
compensatory central wage claims, especially when unemployment is low. In  the 
General Theory Keynes had excluded market-induced wage changes but made a 
similar assumption of relative-wage rather than real-wage preferences. The 
assumption of relative-wage preferences was then largely ignored in economics. It 
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reappeared in the Aukrust/EFO model (the Scandinavian inflation model) during the 
1960s but not until the 1970s and 1980s in Anglo Saxon economics.
43  
 
By experience-based inductive theorising, Rehn and Meidner could discover salient 
wage mechanisms noticed much later in economics or still masked by the dominating 
efficiency-wage and bargaining(-trade union) theories. In these theories market forces 
are neither direct determinants of wages and employment (for example by mediating a 
profit-wage relation), nor guiding principles for the collective wage process. 
Furthermore modern efficiency-wage and bargaining theories exclude the Rehn-
Meidner case of bounded rationality – firms will be more easy-going in wage 
negotiations when profits are high (X-inefficient wages). Rehn and Meidner’s 
inflation theory still appears as original, especially the theory’s positive relationship 
between actual profit margins on the one hand and labour demand and X-inefficient 
wages on the other and its dynamic relation between wage drift and central wage 
increases.  
 
6. The Rehn-Meidner model and the partial equilibrium theory 
of structural change 
Rehn often underlined that the policy of equal wages for equal jobs and of ‘fair’ wage 
differentials was compatible with conventional equilibrium theory (see Rehn 1969: 
165). The practising of a wages policy of solidarity would simulate a perfect labour-
market equilibrium. This idea was already hinted in the 1951 LO report (LO 1953 
[1951]: 95-9). The report’s analysis of structural change seems to have been governed 
by the partial version of the marginal productivity theory and its static analysis of 
exogenous changes in the composition of product demand and in (marginal) 
productivities between industries (and between firms). Rehn and Meidner were 
probably acquainted with this partial equilibrium analysis through economic 
textbooks from the 1930s.  
                                                           
43 See (Tobin 1972), Solow (1980). In the Aukrust model, higher profits will result in higher nominal 
wages in the wage-leading open sector by boosting firms’ self-financing capacity and by weakening 
their resistance to high wage claims exactly as in the R-M model (Aukrust: 1977: 115). The relation 
between the R-M model and the Aukrust/EFO model is scrutinized in Erixon (2000: 31-4). One 
important difference is that productivity is given in the Aukrust/EFO model while enhanced by a profit-
margin decline in the R-M model. 
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In both the partial marginal productivity theory and the Rehn-Meidner theory relative 
profitability is the driving force behind structural change. The description of wage 
formation in a ‘free’ labour market is also identical – higher pay in expanding sectors 
attracts labour from other sectors. But the incentives to labour mobility differ between 
the models. In the marginal productivity theory, a change in relative demand causes 
sector-based wage differentials to emerge. This induces wage earners to change 
workplace. Wage equalisation is the result of this process of adjustment, since wage 
earners with the same marginal productivity will receive the same pay in the new 
competitive equilibrium. When a wages policy of solidarity is in effect, there can be 
no transfer of labour because of wage differences. Instead, Rehn and Meidner relied 
upon a rationing mechanism. The solidarity wage policy would increase the inflow of 
job applicants (some firms are disfavoured) and vacancies (other firms are favoured) 
which tends to counterbalance the negative effects on mobility caused by weaker pay 
incentives. Moreover, solidaristic wage policy would increase the  firms’ and the 
capital market’s incentive to transfer resources between sectors by increasing 
differences in profitability, a startling difference to the partial equilibrium model. 
However, a sluggish labour market may hamper structural change; mobility-
enhancing ALMP must therefore be used to oil the mechanism of rationing.
44 
 
According to Rehn and Meidner, large wage differentials to attain structural change, 
are inflationary, as being unacceptable from an equity point of view. Their preference 
for wages policy of solidarity was based on a conviction that wage differentials must 
grow large in order to create significant labour mobility because of inertia in the 
labour market.
45 In fact the Rehn-Meidner mechanism is better described by a general 
disequilibrium stock-flow model than by a partial (static) equilibrium model. In the 
latter model, wage differentials in long-run equilibrium reflect differences in marginal 
productivity between wage earners. In a dynamic stock-flow model wage differentials 
                                                           
44 Profit differentials will actually increase in the R-M model not only through wages policy of 
solidarity but also through ALMP facilitating dynamic firms’ recruitment of scarce labour. See LO 
(1953 [1951]: 90-4), Meidner (1969a: 193), Rehn (1969: 157), (1977: 214), (1980: 43-6), (1982: 44), 
(1987: 67). 
 
45 Rehn (1948 [1952]: 44-5), (1969: 165), (1987: 69 and 73-7), LO (1953 [1951]: 34, 95-6). 
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between people with different skill are disequilibrium phenomena, e.g. reflecting 
rigidities in the matching and learning process.   
 
Thus there is no reason to emphasise the influence of the partial equilibrium theory 
for the labour market on the R-M model. In conflict with this theory, Rehn and 
Meidner’s wages policy of solidarity limits the chances of bringing about a transfer of 
labour through the wage mechanism. Profit differentials will induce structural change 
in both the partial-equilibrium and Rehn-Meidner theory but profit differences are 
reinforced by the wage (and employment) policy of the R-M model. 
  
7. The Rehn-Meidner model and the Swedish growth school 
The growth theory underlying the R-M model has some similarities to Joseph 
Schumpeter’s structural analysis. The closing down of low-productivity firms and 
industries due to profit pressure in the Rehn-Meidner theory is an example of ‘creative 
destruction’ (Schumpeter 1976 [1943]: 83). Erik Dahmén’s dissertation in 1950 about 
Swedish economic development in the interwar period was inspired by Schumpeter’s 
emphasis on the struggle between new and established firms or industries. Dahmén 
associated ‘the negative side of the transformation (development) process’, primarily 
as a result of innovations, with bankruptcies and structural change (Dahmén 1970 
[1950]: 46, 49, 394). Moreover, the integrated business-cycle and growth analysis in 
works by Schumpeter and his followers has a clear correspondence in the Rehn-
Meidner theory.  
 
Many Swedish economists, including the Stockholm school economists Lundberg and 
Ingvar Svennilson, were influenced by Dahmén’s dissertation. In fact Rehn and 
Meidner developed their ideas in an intellectual climate deeply affected by the 
Dahménian approach, a Schumpeterian analysis that was soon to be swept away by 
the second mathematical revolution in economics (cf. Mirowski 2002). In the 1940s 
Rehn and Meidner might have participated in seminars, e.g. at Stockholm university, 
where Dahmén presented his structural analysis. But Rehn and Meidner never referred 
to Dahmén’s work. Informally, Rehn often expressed a negative opinion about 
Dahmén’s dissertation and the Schumpeterian tradition in general though without any   25
argumentation.
46 Meidner explicitly referred to his Marxian and Keynesian influences 
but not to any work by Schumpeter or by members of the ‘Swedish growth school’, 
for instance Dahmén and Johan Åkerman (see Meidner 1980 and 1999). 
 
It is difficult to discern a direct linkage between the 1951 LO report and works by the 
Swedish growth school. In the mid-1940s Svennilson, who later attempted to integrate 
a Stockholm-school and a structural-analytical perspective, presented a paper 
anticipating a vintage approach. The productivity of industries and countries will 
increase through investment embodying the latest technology (Svennilson 1944: 240-
2). But Svennilson did not provide room here for a transformation approach by 
assuming that overall productivity will be stimulated by the elimination of firms with 
older technologies or by rationalisation (ibid.: 240). It was first in his magnum opus 
‘Growth and Stagnation in the European Economy’ from 1954, thus after the LO 
report, that Svennilson posited that productivity is stimulated by structural change 
through profit pressure on doomed companies and industries. Furthermore, 
Svennilson concluded in both the 1944 and the 1954 study that high aggregate 
demand had enhanced productivity growth by stimulating investment in new 
technologies.
47 Svennilson’s ‘Verdoorn Law’, stating that high production growth 
lead to high productivity growth, is the antithesis of the Rehn-Meidner growth theory. 
In the latter theory, pressure on marginal production units resulting in higher 
productivity for the whole industry or country, is prompted by lower  aggregate 
demand and profits in general.
48 
 
Neither was Dahmén’s dissertation based on any initial hypothesis that innovations 
and cost efficiency are enhanced by hard external pressure, for example through 
restrictive macroeconomic policies. Dahmén concluded in the empirical section that 
company productivity and structural change in Swedish manufacturing were 
                                                           
46 In the mid-1950s Rehn had criticized a ‘Schumpeter-Lundberg’ argument about dynamic 
competition – the expansion of innovative industries will be prevented by wage increases in a ‘free’ 
market (Rehn 1953: 280). But Rehn ignored the tendency to equal pay for identical work even in ‘free’ 
labour-markets, hitting all companies, while innovative industries still have, at least temporary, a 
competitive advantage.      
 
47 Svennilson (1954: 57). 
 
48 There are not even a hypothesis in Svennilson’s  ‘Growth and Stagnation in the European Economy’ 
that firms’ productivity will increase through rationalisation during recessions. Productivity varies 
procyclically in Svennilson’s theory, not contercyclically as in the R-M model.   26
stimulated during the 1920s by hard international competition and deflationary 
monetary and exchange-rate policies (Dahmén 1970 [1950]: ch. 3). However there are 
no indications from the 1951 LO report (or conversations) that Rehn and Meidner had 
read these parts of Dahmén’s dissertation. Furthermore, Dahmén did not discuss the 
possibility that structural change and rationalisation could increase through wage 
policies. Rehn and Meidner’s growth theory was further outlined in the late 1940s, 
thus before the publication of Dahmén’s thesis. 
 
To conclude, Rehn and Meidner might have been affected in general by leading 
Swedish economists’ strong interest in Dahmén’s structural approach at the time of 
the 1951 LO report. However, there are no clear indications that the 1951 LO report 
was directly inspired by the Swedish growth school. Besides, at that time, Rehn and 
Meidner were mainly occupied with stabilisation and wage-policy issues, not with 
secular economic developments as Dahmén in his dissertation. 
 
8 Hans Singer and the Rehn-Meidner model 
Hans W Singer (1910-2006) was a German-born economist who received his PhD in 
Cambridge UK in the mid-1930s. Singer, most famous for his hypothesis about the 
disadvantages of trade for exporters of primary products, was strongly influenced by 
Schumpeter and Keynes. Singer’s research on unemployment in the late 1930s had a 
significant impact on the Beveridge plan. However in the 1940s Singer became 
increasingly critical to the Beveridge view of economic policy. In an article published 
by Economic Journal in 1947 Singer shed light on the dilemma of the trade union 
movement and the restrictions on and negative effects of incomes policy under full 
employment conditions (Singer 1947). Meidner referred to Singer’s article in the late 
1940s (see Meidner, 1952 [1948]: 23-6) and also in an interview in the 1990s. In fact, 
Meidner called attention here to the decisive role of Singer’s article for the 1951 LO 
report: 
 
I read the economist H W Singer’s article on the dilemma of trade unions in a situation of full 
employment in Economic Journal 1947. For me, this article started the whole process resulting 




By this declaration Meidner expressed his dependency on Singer but also that Rehn 
might have had other inspirers; Rehn never mentioned any influence from Singer.
50 
 
A close comparison confirms the similarities between Singer’s article and the 1951 
LO report (and the articles by Meidner and Rehn in the late 1940s). As the LO report 
Singer expressed doubts about the possibility, and also the rationality for trade unions 
and society, of coordinated wage restraint under full-employment conditions. He 
maintained, as Rehn and Meidner, that voluntary incomes policy would threaten the 
raison d’être and unity of the trade union movement. Singer also emphasised, exactly 
as Rehn and Meidner, that collective wage restraint did not rule out market-induced 
wage increases through wage bidding between companies for scarce (especially 
skilled) labour. He also stressed, as later Rehn and Meidner, that wage increases 
through market forces in combination with collective wage moderation would 
generate wage-wage spirals in due course (Singer 1947: 446-9, 453). Furthermore, 
Singer discussed as the 1951 LO report the possibility that the establishment of a 
‘rational’ wage structure might control wage races. He made the qualification, 
reappearing in the writings of Rehn and Meidner, that central agreements about fair 
wages are not a sufficient condition for modest wage increases when labour is scarce. 
Moreover Singer’s scepticism towards the possibility of establishing criteria for fair 
wage differentials was shared by Rehn and Meidner in the 1951 LO report.
51 Finally, 
Singer’s article contained the forthcoming Rehn-Meidner argument that high profits 
due to wage restraint might rescue less efficient (marginal) firms and result in less 
managerial efficiency (Singer 1947: 440 and 444). 
 
                                                           
49 Translation from Swedish. It is noteworthy that Meidner held in 1997 that Singer’s article fifty years 
earlier was a one hit wonder -  ‘I had never heard of Singer before, he got his brilliant idea and was 
never heard of again.’ Greider, ibid.  
 
50 In the 1980s, Rehn made references to the General Theory to anchor his hostility to incomes policy 
(Rehn 1980: 29). However it was not clear from Rehn’s reference that Keynes questioned the 
possibility of trade unions to directly determine employment, not their possibility to affect general 
nominal wage developments as in the Singer-Rehn-Meidner theory (see Keynes 1936: ch. 19). 
 
51 Cf. Singer (1947: 453-55), LO 1953 [1951]: 97-8). The 1951 LO report had expressed scepticism 
against a systematic job evaluation and also argued for wage equalization between different 
occupations in similar terms as LO did in the 1960s (see LO 1953 [1951]: 98). 
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The striking similarities between Singer’s article and the 1951 LO report makes it 
essential to distinguish those parts of the LO report which have no correspondence in 
his article. Rehn and Meidner argued for central wage coordination while Singer – 
conspicuously critical to the Beveridge plan of national wage restraint - preferred 
industrial bargaining. Moreover Singer had a more tolerant attitude to inflation than 
Rehn and Meidner. Thus, there were no arguments in his article for a restrictive 
macroeconomic policy to prevent wage drift and subsequent wage-wage spirals as in 
the 1951 LO report. Singer’s article was published in December 1947; the focus on 
stabilisation policy in contemporary endeavours by Rehn and Meidner to formulate a 
new economic policy indicates that crucial elements of their model were formed 
independently of Singer’ article; perhaps already in the late 1946 as maintained by 
Rehn. Furthermore, Singer did not mention the possibility of ALMP. He also rejected 
the wages policy of solidarity, mainly on practical grounds, but added that structural 
change might be speeded up by larger wage differentials (Singer 1947: 440-1).  
 
To conclude, Singer’s article in Economic Journal in 1947 appears to be the most 
important individual inspiration source of the R-M model. However, the policy means 
of the model – a restrictive macroeconomic policy, a wages policy of solidarity and 
and active labour market policy – cannot be found in Singer’s article. Moreover, 
actual (intra-marginal) profits have no role in Singer’s account of the inflation 
process.  
   
9. Influential Anglo Saxon macroeconomists and the Rehn- 
    Meidner model  
The central position of the R-M model in Swedish economic-policy debate during the 
early postwar period was not matched by a similar interest on the international level. 
When theorising about the observed trade-off between inflation and unemployment in 
the 1960s prominent Anglo-Saxon economists did not refer to the R-M model. An 
international breakthrough for the model occurred however at a conference in the late 
1960s celebrating Erik Lundberg’s 60
th anniversary. Among the prominent 
participants were not only Lundberg, Ohlin, Myrdal and Svennilson but also Edward 
Denison, James Duesenberry, Bent Hansen, Nicholas Kaldor, Fritz Machlup, Charles 
Myers, Lloyd Reynolds, Paul Samuelson and James Tobin. Paradoxically, the   29
conference came to focus on the Rehn-Meidner ideas, not on the thinking of 
Lundberg, the guest of honour and the main critic of the Swedish economic policy 
model. 
 
Nicholas Kaldor held up the R-M model as an alternative to Anglo-Saxon theories 
about a natural rate of growth and unemployment: 
 
Against that I find the Rehn approach – I must confess I’ve learned something at this 
conference and I shall go away a wiser man – a breath of fresh air.  
(Kaldor 1969: 159) 
 
Kaldor referred here to Rehn’s hypothesis that wage pressure and a restrictive 
economic policy (in combination with a mobility-enhancing labour market policy) 
would promote productivity growth, primarily by enhancing structural change. Many 
of the international guests on the Lundberg conference also paid their tribute to 
Swedish labour market policy and declared the relevancy of this policy in the 
discussion of the Phillips curve. 
 
In fact, the attention paid to the ‘Rehn model’ at the Lundberg conference impelled 
Ohlin to make the somewhat annoyed remark:  
 
The fact that we have discussed so much the LO-Rehn model type of reasoning doesn’t mean 
that this is the only line along which thinking is going on in Sweden. There are all kinds of 
lines, and I’m quite sure that the Swedish economists present here would represent quite a 
number of lines; there would be very considerable differences of opinion.  
(Ohlin 1969: 173)  
 
The acceptance of the novelty and also validity of the R-M model at the Lundberg 
conference in the late 1960s shall not obscure that other economic policy programmes 
and economic theories won the day during subsequent decades. The notions of 
rational expectations and time inconsistencies in decision-making have no 
correspondence in the R-M model. Moreover the new consensus in macroeconomics 
has not yet incorporated the Rehn-Meidner idea that productivity might be stimulated 
by tight economic policy and wage pressure. The victory of a new paradigm in 
macroeconomics explains why also Swedish economists gradually lost the interest in   30
the R-M model from the 1970s. Foreign economists friendly to the ‘Swedish model’ 
stressed the positive impact of central wage restraint, labour market policy, and also 
of wage compression, on Sweden’s macroeconomic performance in the 1970s and 
1980s.
52 But they largely ignored the coherent and diversified character of the R-M 
policy model including the role of restrictive macroeconomic policy as an alternative 
to incomes policy and as a device to attain economic growth.  
 
The international literature on the productivity decline in OECD countries in the 
1970s and 1980s focused on the Verdoorn Law. Slow demand growth was said to 
have lessened the opportunities of exploiting economies of scale, led to fewer 
investments embodying technical change or resulted in negative labour-hoarding 
effects. In fact Rehn himself used Verdoorn-like arguments for demand stimulation 
when unemployment increased in OECD countries after OPEC I and II – stimuli of 
total demand would have increased productivity due to increasing returns to scale.
53 It 
was not until his last years that Rehn returned to his original productivity theory – 
high profits will reduce efforts by firm agents to become more efficient (Rehn 1993: 
18-9). 
 
Post-Keynesian economists leaned to the Verdoorn Law, not the Rehn-Meidner 
growth theory, when challenging the new consensus in macroeconomics. In the late 
1970s, Kaldor observed a positive correlation between changes in relative unit labour 
costs (RULC) and changes in market shares in OECD countries. He could have 
explained the correlation by referring to the beneficial effects of negative driving 
forces in line with Rehn’s productivity theory. However Kaldor was too loyal to the 
post-Keynesian tradition and to Verdoorn’s Law to draw the conclusion that strong 
wage pressure had resulted in higher market shares by fostering structural change, 
efficiency and renewal. Instead Kaldor maintained that high market shares for a 
country had strengthened its exchange rate and, further, that high relative prices 
through high RULC were associated with large market shares in value terms (see 
Kaldor 1978).  
 
                                                           
52 See e.g. Jackman et al. (1990), Layard (1991), Nickell and Bell (1996). 
 
53 Rehn (1982: 1-5), (1986: 84-5).   31
Productivity theories similar to that underpinning the R-M model appeared again in 
Anglo-Saxon economics during the 1990s (Aghion and Howitt 1998: 239-43). One 
point of reference was the low productivity growth in OECD countries during the 
boom of the 1980s. Without knowledge about the R-M model a new generation of 
endogenous (neoclassical-Schumpeterian) growth economists explained a 
countercyclical productivity (growth) pattern by reference to the use of X-
inefficiencies and the elimination of inefficient production units in recessions. The 
inclusion of these ideas in the ‘new growth theory’ strengthens an argument about the 
innovative character of the R-M model.  
 
10. The uniqueness of the Rehn-Meidner policy programme 
Rehn and Meidner’s theory of wages, inflation and growth had some original features. 
In fact, it is difficult to discuss the uniqueness of the Rehn-Meidner policy programme 
without referring to the originality of its underlying theory. Yet Rehn and Meidner’s 
policy model constituted their major contribution to economics. The survey of the 
economic literature above had difficulties to discern external impulses to Rehn and 
Meidner’s policy programme. A conspicuous fact is that two trade union economists 
affiliated to the Stockholm school defined a unique alternative to Keynesianism in the 
early postwar period. By seeing restrictive macroeconomic policy in the medium term 
as a crucial element in stabilisation policy Rehn and Meidner broke with the 
prevailing Keynesian doctrine. But a concentration on individual policy means 
conceals that it was the comprehensive character and interdependent relations of the 
R-M policy model that made it a social innovation. The means of the model were not 
new in themselves. A common, but misleading, conlusion in the literature on the 
‘Swedish model’ is that Rehn and Meidner invented the wages policy of solidarity and 
ALMP. The policy of solidarity had been suggested not only by Cassel at the turn of 
the century but also by LO in the mid 1930s. In fact SAF had already introduced 
wages of solidary in the 1920s - expanding companies were not allowed by SAF to 
attract scarce labour by wage competition (Faxén 1989). Neither was labour market 
policy a new phenomenon in Sweden nor in other countries at the time of the 1951 
LO report. Public employment offices had existed in Sweden since the early 20
th 
century (Wadensjö 2001: 4). Furthermore, the social democrat government and also 
the liberal party (Folkpartiet), led by Ohlin, supported the expansion of active labour   32
market policy immediately after the Second World War. A coordinating government 




First the R-M model was unique through its combination of goals and means – the 
model combined an active labour market policy and a wages policy of solidarity with 
a restrictive macroeconomic policy to attain all four goals of postwar economic 
policy, full employment, price stability, growth and equity. The model had also a fifth 
objective – to advance the position of labour, both individually and collectively. 
Individual wage earners’ would attain ‘security by wings’ by full employment 
(increasing also the strength of organized labour) and flexible labour markets (Rehn 
1977b: 125-6). One aspect of the R-M model’s originality was the combination of 
non-market (regulating) and market-conforming measures. The model was market 
conforming by its emphasis on supply and matching oriented ALMP, restrictive 
general economic policy, anticipation of a long run labour-market equilibrium through 
wages policy of solidarity and exclusion of incomes policy (price controls and wage 
restraint). The R-M model was not market conforming through its high ambitions in 
employment policy, recommendations of wage coordination to achieve wages of 
solidarity, priority of public saving and also resistance towards wage flexibility to 
achieve full employment; in fact ALMP measures for full employment was meant to 
reinforce downward wage rigidity in the economy.  
 
Second, the R-M model was unique through its functional relationships. Each 
instrument had more than one goal. For example, ALMP should satisfy all for goals of 
economic policy (and also increase labour strength). The diverse character of each 
instrument is an important explanation of the model’s application in Sweden. 
Arguments about price stability and structural change yielded a strong alibi for AMLP 
and a wages policy of solidarity.
55 Moreover, the satisfaction of several targets by the 
                                                           
54 The qualification must be made, however, that the LO definition of a wages policy of solidarity was 
unclear in the 1930s and early 1940s according to Meidner (Meidner 1974: 11-4). Furthermore, Rehn 
and Meidner advocated extensive labour market policy programmes also in good times thus that the 
policy’s counter-cyclical pattern should be weakened (Meidner 1969: 191-2). Moreover, Rehn 
maintained that the extent of mobility-enhancing labour-market policy measures in the R-M model was 
an innovation (Rehn 1977a: 207, 225). 
55 There were many examples in the 1960s of Swedish union representatives on the industry and local 
levels accepting the disappearance of jobs in stagnating low-wage industries (see textile and clothing   33
same means implies that the R-M model is not hit by the Hansen-Tinbergen rules for 
policy consistency – the number of instruments (three in the R-M model) must be at 
least as many as the number of targets (at least four in the R-M model).
56 Another 
unique feature of the functional relationships in the R-M model is that the instruments 
interact thus, each mean is a necessary condition for the efficiency of other means. 
For example, to attain price stability, high growth and fair wages, a restrictive 
macroeconomic policy and a wages policy of solidarity must be supported by AMLP 
measures aimed at speeding up labour mobility. 
 
The comprehensive and cohesive character of the Rehn-Meidner policy programme 
makes it distinct from most other macroeconomic models’ defining a fewer number of 
economic-policy goals, one instrument for every goal and additional instead of 
interacting functional relationships. The formalisation of the R-M model was 
prevented, however, not only by Rehn and Meidner’s weak interest in participating in 




A Swedish economic and wage policy programme was formed by two trade-union 
economists, Gösta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner, in the early post-war period. Rehn and 
Meidner were certainly influenced by the Zeitgeist of the Keynesian revolution and 
the industrial-policy and planning ambitions of the Swedish labour movement. 
Furthermore, Meidner, and perhaps Rehn as well, was influenced by Hans Singer’s 
analysis of trade-union dilemmas and the limitations of incomes policy in an economy 
approaching full employment. Rehn and Meidner were probably also inspired by 
Singer’s analysis of productivity stimulus through wage pressure. All these influences 
shall not hide, however, the independency and originality of the R-M model where its 
underlying economic theory is concerned. The model’s positive relationship between 
actual profits and wages had no correspondence even in Singer’s work. And Rehn and 
Meidner’s explanation of the underlying mechanism is still of interest. However Rehn 
                                                                                                                                                                      
industry in particular) referring to the need for labour mobility and structural change. See Meidner 
(1974: 67), Rehn (1977a: 217-8), (1980: 64). 
 
56 See Tinbergen (1956: 55-6). 
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and Meidner’s main contribution to economics was their comprehensive and coherent 
policy model. The instruments were market-conforming alternatives to the post-war 
Keynesian stabilisation-policy (regulation) model but still centralist and 
interventionist and also aimed at increasing economic growth, equity and labour 
strength. The R-M model was primarily based on intuitive, experience-based, 
theorising by Rehn and Meidner in their profession as trade union economists, not on 
deductive economic modeling or even economic research in a conventional sense. In 
fact, at the time of the 1951 LO report, Rehn and Meidner had limited knowledge of 
theoretical developments and econometric studies in economics.  
 
Lundberg, and also Meidner, emphasised Rehn’s creative personality. By giving 
prominence to Rehn’s innovative role in the formation of the R-M model Meidner 
hardly expressed any false modesty. It was Rehn who added a restrictive 
macroeconomic policy to their programme, a radical step in the age of the Keynesian 
revolution, and ‘put the pieces together’ (Meidner 2003: 215-6). However, future 
research must distinguish more carefully the separate and joint contributions by Rehn 
and Meidner to a policy programme which was given their names. Deeper research 
must also distinguish the contributions by other persons at the LO’s research 
department to the R-M policy model or to the arguments for its logic and complexity. 
However it is unlikely that this research will dispute the importance of Rehn, and also 
of Meidner, for the birth of a unique Swedish model for macroeconomic stability, 
growth, equity and labour strength, a policy programme that was partially applied in 
Sweden in the post-war period. 
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